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REFORMING THE KATZ FOURTH
AMENDMENT "REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY" TEST: THE CASE OF INFRARED
SURVEILLANCE OF HOMES
It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachment thereon.'
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment applies to both searches and seizures. This Note will only
discuss searches. Issues dealing with Fourth Amendment seizures are beyond the scope
of this Note. For a discussion of seizure issues, see generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOuRTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987).
For general discussion of Fourth Amendment search issues, see Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Craig M. Bradley,
Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1974).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The national illicit marijuana market persists despite large-scale
coordinated efforts to destroy it.3 As state and federal law enforcement
authorities reduced the flow of illegal marijuana4 into the United States
from other countries,5 domestic production of marijuana increased to
meet the new demand.6 In response, American law enforcement
agencies attacked domestic marijuana farms.7 This caused the marijuana
cultivators to move their operations indoors and use hydroponic growth
techniques.8 To combat this trend, police began using high technology
surveillance techniques, including infrared detection to locate illegal
marijuana growth operations.9 Although the use of infrared detection is
highly effective,'0 some courts hold that it violates the Constitution."
American Courts apply the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
3. Despite well funded and highly organized efforts to eradicate marijuana, production
within the United States nearly tripled, growing from 2.6 million pounds in 1981 to 7.7
million pounds in 1987. Michael Isikoff, U.S. Targets Domestic Crop of Marijuana;
Critics Call Program Futile, Wasteful, WASH. POST, July 3, 1988, at Al, A22.
4. For the purpose of this Note, the author is assuming that all marijuana is illegal.
5. Isikoff, supra note 3, at A22. In 1977, the United States began a campaign of
spraying paraquat, an herbicide used to kill weeds, on the Mexican marijuana crop. This
caused American marijuana consumers to abandon the use of Mexican marijuana for fear
of its effect on their health. As a result, the Mexican marijuana market nearly collapsed
and American producers filled the demand. Id.
6. Id. In 1980, domestically grown marijuana accounted for 10% of all American
marijuana. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1992 DOMESTIC
CANNABIS ERADICATION/SUPPRESSION PROGRAM 1 (1992) [hereinafter CANNABIS
ERADICATION]. By 1992, domestically grown marijuana accounted for 25% of American
marijuana. Id.
7. In 1988, the Reagan administration instituted "Operation Stop Crop," an extensive
effort to eradicate outdoor domestic marijuana production. The operation included the
deployment of the National Guard to eradicate marijuana fields, a toll-free number for
citizens to report marijuana to authorities, and expanded undercover surveillance. Isikoff,
supra note 3, at Al.
8. Mark A. Stein, Pot Growers Retreat Inside, Under Lights in High-Tech Battle, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1988, at 3.
9. See infra part II.B. for a definition and discussion of infrared detection technology.
10. Since law enforcement agencies began using infrared detection technology, they
have seized nearly 4,000 indoor marijuana growing operations. CANNABIS ERADICATION,
supra note 6, at 29.
11. See infra part IV.B. for a discussion of the cases holding infrared detection
unconstitutional.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/10
1996] THE CASE OF INFRARED SURVEILLANCE OF HOMES 249
developed in Katz v. United States12 to determine the constitutionality
of the surveillance techniques used by law enforcement agencies. 3
This test establishes whether a warrantless search violates the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
4
Courts apply this test to decide the constitutionality of infrared detection
of homes. 5
Part II of this Note describes the social trends that led to increased
indoor production of marijuana. It discusses indoor marijuana cultivation
and law enforcement use of infrared detection devices to locate marijuana
production sites. Part III examines the development of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure law. It discusses the more traditional
rules used by American courts, and the reasons for their replacement by
the current rule of Fourth Amendment analysis. Part IV considers recent
court opinions on the constitutionality of warrantless infrared detection.
Part V analyzes recent court applications of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test established in Katz to decide the constitutionality of
infrared detection. This section questions the use of technological
analogies to subvert the Katz test and notes the misunderstanding of
infrared detection technology by courts. Part VI presents a two-part
proposal to cure the problems in current Fourth Amendment analysis of
high technology surveillance methods without destroying the framework
established in Katz. First, the proposal urges courts to rule that the use
of infrared detection without a search warrant violates the Fourth
Amendment. Second, the proposal outlines a number of refinements and
clarifications that the courts should make to improve the Katz test.
II. THE BATTLE OVER MARIJUANA CULTIVATION
The phenomenon of indoor marijuana cultivation resulted from the
interplay between marijuana growers and various law enforcement
agencies.' 6 A co-ordinated crackdown 7 on outdoor marijuana cultiva-
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. Id.
15. See infra part IV.
16. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
17. The Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program (DCE/SP) pools federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies to effectively combat domestic marijuana
production. CANNABIS ERADICATION, supra note 6, at 1. This program, administered by
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), coordinates federal resources with
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tion in the late 1980s and early 1990s forced many growers to forego
outdoor production. 8 Instead of abandoning marijuana cultivation,
however, many growers started cultivating marijuana indoors, utilizing
hydroponic cultivation techniques.'9
A. Indoor Marijuana
Marijuana cultivators grow and harvest marijuana indoors through
the use of modem hydroponic techniques.2" Hydroponics is a cultiva-
tion technique which simulates natural growing conditions indoors
without soil or sunlight. Cultivators place the marijuana plants into
containers and circulate water and nutrients through them at regular
intervals.' Growers use high-intensity lamps to provide light,23 and
101 state and local agencies and provides money for anti-marijuana efforts. Id.
18. David Foster, War on Drugs is Driving Pot Growers Underground, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at A3. This crackdown utilized such techniques as aerial
surveillance, herbicide spraying, and commando style "whack-and-stack" raids, in which
law enforcement officials sweep into a marijuana field, harvest and bum the marijuana to
deny the cultivators their crop. Id.
According to the chief of the DEA's marijuana eradication program, efforts to
crackdown on marijuana production are worthwhile: "We feel, and the administration feels,
that this is one of the drugs that we're really having a win with .... The success story
is with marijuana." Joe Hallinan, Home Grown, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct.
12, 1992, at ID, 6D (quoting John Peoples).
19. Foster, supra note 18, at A3. See also Sebastian Rotella, Pot Farms Show Dng
Traffickers Going High Tech, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1990, at A3. During the 1980s the
market share of home-grown marijuana rose from under 10% to 25%. During this same
period "domestic marijuana production grew from 2.6 million pounds to more than 10.1
million pounds," primarily due to stepped-up drug enforcement at United States borders.
Increased border surveillance led to a reduction in Colombian and Mexican marijuana
competition. Frank Greve, DEA Cracks Down on Indoor Mariquana Growing, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Oct. 29, 1989, at 20A.
Other factors also contributed to the movement of marijuana growing indoors, including
the cultivators' frustration at thieves stealing outdoor crops and the unpredictability of the
weather. Dennis McCafferty, Authorities Trying to Weed Out Indoor Marjuana Growers,
ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Oct. 24, 1993, at Al, A10.
20. David Noel, Hydroponics Kits Fertilize Suspicions, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June
8, 1992, at J4.
21. Id.
22. Greve, supra note 19, at 20A.
23. To grow marijuana indoors successfully, cultivators need to supply the plants with
artificial light while keeping the air temperature within reasonable limits. High-intensity
discharge lights, which use between 400 and 1000 watt bulbs, provide the necessary light
for indoor marijuana cultivation. These bulbs generate temperatures of approximately 150
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they pump a precise mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide into the
growth area." By using these techniques, marijuana growers can
produce harvestable plants up to three times faster than under outdoor
conditions.' The recent proliferation of hydroponically grown
marijuana demonstrates the success of these techniques.2 6
degrees or more. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
These high intensity lights were originally developed to televise indoor sporting events.
Because television cameras are calibrated for sunlight, these lights were developed to
match the frequency of sunlight. See Ed Rosenthal, Pot Moves Inside; Indoor Growing
of Marijuana, WHOLE EARTH REv., Mar. 22, 1987, at 62-63 (discussing a marijuana
cultivation enthusiast who took the author to a Seattle SuperSonics basketball game to
show him the "secret" of indoor marijuana cultivation).
24. A technical obstacle growers must overcome in order to grow plants
hydroponically is the delivery of water, oxygen, and mineral nutrients to the plant roots.
Seventeen chemical elements are necessary for normal plant growth. Nine elements are
required in relatively large amounts: carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sulfur, phosphorus,
calcium, magnesium, potassium, and nitrogen. Eight others are required in trace amounts:
iron, zinc, copper, manganese, boron, chlorine, cobalt, and molybdenum. Carbon,
hydrogen, and oxygen are supplied from the air. 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 662,664
(1993); 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 195 (1993).
25. Noel, supra note 20, at J4. Hydroponic growth techniques, together with various
genetic techniques, make marijuana cultivation more profitable now than it was in the past.
Foster, supra note 18, at A3. Additionally, marijuana grown indoors contains up to 10
times the amount of Delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the psychoactive chemical in
marijuana, than earlier varieties. Id. Due to careful breeding and high-technology
horticulture, home-grown American marijuana today ranks as "the best in the world,"
according to DEA's Cannabis Investigations Section Chief, John Sutton. Greve, supra
note 19, at 20A.
Hydroponic growth techniques require a substantial investment from illicit cultivators,
both in time and money, compared to outdoor growth techniques. See McCafferty, supra
note 19, at A1O. But see Hallinan, supra note 18, at ID (building a marijuana "grow"
closet, complete with lights, fan and irrigation system costs about $300).
26. "Nationally, nearly 350,000 plants in 3,850 indoor sites were seized in 1992, up
from an estimated 282,900 plants in 2,850 sites the year before." McCafferty, supra note
19, at AI0. See also CANNABIS ERADICATION, supra note 6, at 29-30.
Hydroponic marijuana cultivation is so successful that Pyraponic Industries, Inc., a
corporation that manufactures a popular hydroponic growth box, the Phototron II super-
terrarium, earned gross profits in excess of $50 million as of 1989. The corporation sold
over 90,000 units for approximately $400 per unit. Greve, supra note 19, at 20A. See
Kim Kowsky, Business Honor Goes to a Most Unusual High Tech Firm, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
2, 1990, at DI. In fact, the corporation did so well that in 1990 the Greater San Diego
Chamber of Commerce named it Business of the Year in Manufacturing. Id. It was also
recognized in 1989 by Inc. magazine as one of the 500 fastest growing private
corporations in the United States. The 500 Index, INC., Dec. 1989, at 83.
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B. Infrared Detection
Infrared detection27 refers to a number of closely related devices
28
that permit law enforcement officials29 to monitor and visualize"
otherwise hidden objects by utilizing infrared emissions.31 More
27. Infrared detection devices rely on technology developed in the 1950s for military
applications. Dan Bernstein, Marifuana Raiders Go High-Tech, Foes Say Infrared Sensors
Invade Privacy, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 2, 1991, at Bi, B8.
Infrared detection devices range in price from inexpensive models costing between
$15,000 and $25,000 to expensive models used in military applications costing $150,000
to $225,000. Bradley J. Plaschke, United States v. Deaner: Thermal Imagery, The Latest
Assault on the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 607, 607 n.2, 4 (1994) (interviewing Col. Carlos Aniglioh, President, Thermal
Technologies, Inc. regarding thermal imaging technology).
28. Infrared detection is also referred to as "thermal imaging," "thermal imaging
scanning" (TIS), "thermal imaging devices" (TID), and "infrared tracking devices" (1TD).
An infrared detector mounted on a helicopter or an airplane is called a "forward looking
infrared" device or a "FLIR" or "FLID." This Note uses these terms interchangeably. See
United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing TIS); United States
v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 704-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (referring to ITD); United States
v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223-24 (D. Haw. 1991) (speaking of a FLIR); State
v. Russell, 857 P.2d 220, 220 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing TID); Plaschke, supra note
27 (calling this technology "thermal imaging"); Lynne M. Pochurek, Comment, From the
Battlefront to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy
Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137 (1994) (using the terms "infrared surveillance"
and FLID).
29. The DEA sponsors the Thermal Imagery Investigations Seminar, which is a ten-
day thermal-imaging systems course for law enforcement agents. In addition to teaching
agents how to use thermal imagers, "the course teaches theory, technology, legal, and
practical applications." CANNABIS ERADICATION, supra note 6, at 4. This seminar
culminates in DEA certification as a thermographer. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp.
1518, 1521-22 (W.D. Wis. 1994). In 1992, the DEA trained 747 federal, state, and local
law enforcement officers in marijuana related training courses like the Thermal Imagery
Seminar. CANNABIS ERADICATION, supra note 6, at 4.
30. The term "visualize" used here denotes that the results of infrared detection are
shown in a video mode and are recorded on a VHS video-tape. It should be emphasized
that this technology is not an enhancement of human sight. The range of detection
produced by this technology is well beyond human capabilities, both in terms of the
infrared spectrum and its ability to discern differing energy levels. Thus, although the
technology presents its results in a video form, it is not recording sight.
31. "Infrared emissions form part of the infrared spectrum, which includes radio
waves, microwaves, heat, visible light, ultraviolet light, X-rays, and gamma rays. The
difference between each of these forms of energy is the wavelength of the electric and
magnetic fields." Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of
Warrantless Infrared Searches, 29 CRiM. L. BULL. 19, 24 (1993). The infrared device
allows "police officers to sense a part of the spectrum that their eyes could not normally
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specifically, this technology allows officials to detect temperature
variations among and between objects within a structure. 32  Law
enforcement officers use infrared detection to "survei ' '33 suspected
"home-grown" 34 marijuana operations.
Hydroponic growth methods require marijuana growers to use
extensive indoor lighting which produces substantial heat.35 Infrared
detection devices visualize the heat escaping from a structure,36 and
give law enforcement officers clues as to the source of the heat and its
specific location within the structure. 37 By using infrared detection to
surveil a home, police can often determine whether the residents are
growing marijuana indoors.38
perceive in the same way that a geiger counter would have allowed them to tell if
radioactive material was located in the home." Id.
32. The device detects temperature variations of as little as 0.2 degrees Celsius
(approximately 0.36 degrees Fahrenheit). Id. at 24.
33. Throughout this Note the word "surveil" is used to denote the use of infrared
detection devices to investigate for illegal marijuana cultivation. The word "surveil"
means "to subject to surveillance." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1188 (1987).
The author chooses this term to avoid the implication that this technology represents
merely an enhancement of the operator's visual faculties, as would be implied if one used
words such as "see," "look," "view," or "observe." In addition, the author wishes to avoid
the term "search," except as it relates to the Katz standard. For a discussion of Katz, see
infra part III.B.
34. The term "home-grown" refers to the growing of marijuana indoors, for example,
in houses, barns, and in underground caverns. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 8, at 3.
35. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
36. Law enforcement officials describe the infrared detection device as "a passive,
non-intrusive instrument... that does not send any beams or rays into the area on which
it is fixed or in any way penetrate the structures within that area." Steele, supra note 31,
at 21 n.12.
37. After an infrared detector scans a structure, various shades of grey will appear on
a screen. The shade of grey depends on the amount of heat the object is radiating and the
"emissivity" of the object. A hot object, such as a high-intensity light bulb, will appear
white. Id. at 24.
38. The determination made by police officers that the residents are growing
marijuana, however, is sometimes false. See, e.g., United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp.
205, 214 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that information gathered through thermal imaging is
consistent with cultivating african violets and other legal activities); McCafferty, supra
note 19, at A1, A 10 (noting an instance where law enforcement agents mistakenly searched
a house suspected of hiding a home-grown operation); Eric Schlosser, Reefer Madness;
Part 1; Criminalization of Marijuana, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1994, at 45 (stating that
the heat sources detected by thermal imaging may indicate a pottery kiln or a jacuzzi).
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH CASES AND INFRARED DETECTION
A. Traditional Analysis
The Supreme Court originally construed the Fourth Amendment
liberally in order to emphasize the importance of preventing the
government from interfering with the security of persons and property.39
In Boyd v. United States,40 the trial court heard a challenge to a law
which provided that, in certain noncriminal proceedings, the government
could compel a party to produce books or papers relating to the
proceeding.4 If the party refused, the court would hold that the party
had confessed to the government's allegations.42 The Supreme Court
held that this law effected a search and seizure and violated the Fourth
Amendment, even though no physical search or seizure took place.43
In Olmstead v. United States,4" decided forty-two years after Boyd,
the Court narrowed the scope of the Fourth Amendment, centering the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures on the concept of
physical trespass.4 5 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court ruled that a
wiretap of a defendant's private telephone line by the government
without a search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.46 The
Court rationalized that because the police conducted the wiretap without
physical trespass it did not violate an individual's right to be secure in
39. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The Court stated that a close
and literal construction of the Fourth Amendment deprives it of its efficacy and "leads to
gradual depreciation of the right. ... It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment thereon." Id.
For a general discussion of the scope of privacy rights, see Ken Gormley, One Hundred
Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335 (1992).
40. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
41. Id. at 619-20.
42. Id. at 620.
43. Id. at 622. The Court elaborated, stating that although the law's effect "is divested
of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure ... it contains their
substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose." Id. at 635.
The Court also held that the act violated the Fifth Amendment privilege from self-
incrimination. Id. at 633-35.
44. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
45. Id. at 464-66.
46. Id. at 466.
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his person, house, papers, and effects.47  Olmstead established that
surveillance conducted without any physical trespass fell outside the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment, while surveillance that involved
physical trespass required a search warrant.48
Olmstead provided a clear standard both for law enforcement
officers and for courts. The cases that followed Olmstead reinforced the
requirement of physical intrusion to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment
violation.49 Commentators criticized the rule for being unresponsive to
new technological developments.50 However, in Silverman v. United
47. Id. "Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the
residences of four of the petitioners and those leading from the chief office. The insertions
were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants." Id. at 456-57.
Chief Justice Taft held that a wiretap was neither a search nor a seizure because ears
cannot trespass, nor were the "wires... part of [the defendant's] house or office any more
than are the highways along which they are stretched." Id. at 465. See also Shirley M.
Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental
Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1483, 1493-95 (1979) (arguing that the
Olmstead decision was the result of an impermissibly literalist interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment).
48. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. "The [Fourth] Amendment does not forbid what was
done here .... There was no entry of the house or offices of the defendant." Id. "[T]he
doctrine derived from Olmstead v. United States, and Goldman v. United States, [was] that
if police officers had not been guilty of a common-law trespass they were not prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment from eavesdropping.. . ." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978) (citations omitted).
Olmstead confined the Fourth Amendment to situations where the defendant was forced
to endure "an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or
his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for
the purpose of making a seizure." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
Justice Brandeis and Justice Stone strongly dissented from the Olmstead decision
because they believed that the actions of the Government were an "Unjustifiable intrusion
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual," and thus a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Gormley,
supra note 39, at 1361-62 (discussing Justice Brandeis' dissent from Olmstead).
49. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation where the defendant, while at his place of business, voluntarily
spoke with a narcotics officer wearing a concealed microphone because voluntarily
allowing entry vitiates trespass); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (finding
no Fourth Amendment violation where a dictaphone was used to listen to a defendant in
a room adjoining the room being investigated). See generally Gormley, supra note 39, at
1357-74 (discussing Fourth Amendment privacy).
After Olmstead, judges and attorneys focused on issues of trespass, including ownership,
custody, and control of the property at issue. Hufstedler, supra note 47, at 1494.
50. Scholars repeatedly voiced dissatisfaction with the Olmstead standard because its
mechanical approach was too simplistic to cope with the emerging technology of law
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States,"' the Supreme Court began to hint that trespass was not the
exclusive means by which courts could address Fourth Amendment
concerns.52 Yet, the Court refused to overrule Olmstead for another six
years.53
B. The Katz Doctrine
In Katz v. United States,m the Supreme Court explicitly overruled
the Olmstead standard.55 Katz considered the constitutionality of law
enforcement officers placing a wiretap in a telephone booth. 56 The
Government charged Katz with using a telephone to place bets illegally
in interstate commerce.-" At trial the Government sought to introduce
evidence of the defendant's telephone conversations.58 Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation had intercepted Katz's conversations by
using an electronic recording device which was attached to the outside
of the telephone booth where he placed his calls.59 The trial court
admitted evidence of the conversations over Katz's objection.' When
Katz appealed,6 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his
contention that the recordings of his telephone conversations violated the
enforcement. Hufstedler, supra note 47, at 1495. The perfection and ready availability
of new electronic surveillance devices allowed the government to pose a much greater
threat to personal privacy. Gormley, supra note 39, at 1360-66. As Mr. Justice Brandeis
pointed out in Olmstead, "[S]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the Government." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473.
51. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
52. Id. at 511. The Court stated that "Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably
measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law." Id. See also
Hufstedler, supra note 47, at 1495.
53. See infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
decision to overrule Olmstead.
54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55. Id. at 353.
56. Id. at 348.
57. Id. The authorities convicted Katz under 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1990). This statute
provided in part: "Whoever... uses a wire communication facility for the transmission
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers ... shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Fourth Amendment, because "there was no physical entrance into the
area occupied by [Katz]."6 2
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and
held that subsequent decisions had weakened the "trespass" doctrine
established in Olmstead, and thus it no longer controlled.63 The Court
placed no constitutional significance on the fact that the device used to
record Katz's conversations did not penetrate the telephone booth.'
Instead of relying on the "trespass" doctrine, the Court held that "what
[a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. 65
In the cases that followed, the Supreme Court adopted a new
standard set forth in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, as the Fourth
Amendment rule. 66 Justice Harlan announced a two-fold test67 for
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches: "[F]irst
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."'' Justice Harlan's two-pronged test
supported the majority's reasoning that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. 69
Despite spirited scholarly debate on the issue, the courts have
continued to employ the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to
decide whether a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment
62. Id. at 134.
63. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
64. Id. at 354.
65. Id. at 351-52.
66. Id. at 360-62. The Court formally adopted Justice Harlan's concurrence in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
67. This two-fold test became known as the "reasonable expectation of privacy test."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
68. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. After applying the two-part test to the facts at issue in
Katz, Justice Harlan concluded that the electronic surveillance of an individual in a
telephone booth violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. In subsequent Fourth Amendment
cases, Justice Harlan expressed doubts about the correctness of his two-pronged standard.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(1971)).
69. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Scholars interpret this to mean that Fourth Amendment
protections no longer depend on physical trespass onto property ("places"), but instead
depend on the actions and expectations of individuals ("people"). LAFAVE, supra note 2,
§ 2.1(b).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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proscription against unreasonable searches.70
C. The Warrant Requirement
According to the language of the Fourth Amendment, a search is
unreasonable unless a warrant is issued upon probable cause. 7' To
obtain a search warrant, the police must present a "neutral and detached
magistrate ' with information sufficient for the magistrate to determine
that there is probable cause for the police to believe that they will find
contraband or evidence of a crime in the area they propose to search.73
IV. THE K_4,rz DOcTRINE AND INFRARED SURVEILLANCE OF HOMES
The constitutionality of infrared surveillance of homes by law
70. Numerous articles have considered the Katz standard and suggested ways in which
Fourth Amendment analysis could be improved. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People
Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359 (1994) (advocating the use
ofjuries to make Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations); Daniel J. Polatcek,
Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment: Pushing the Katz Test Towards Terminal
Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 453 (1995) (advocating a test based
on the character of information revealed, and expectations of privacy); David E. Steinberg,
Making Sense ofSense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563 (1990) (recognizing the
inability of courts to apply the Katz standard and demonstrating the default standards they
use); Michael Campbell, Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of
the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986) (proposing
a Fourth Amendment standard based on "social norms of privacy'); Note, A
Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154 (1977)
(concluding that courts should first apply a "constitutionally protected areas" standard
before the Katz test); Peter Thornton, Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and
the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 1167 (1977) (advocating the
expansion of the Terry limited search standard to sense-enhancing devices); Kenneth
Troiano, Comment, Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does Closing the Door
Matter Anymore?, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 83 (1988) (suggesting a new definition of"search"
to limit undue sensory augmentation).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The finding of "'probable cause' may rest upon evidence
which is not legally competent in a criminal trial." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 107 (1965).
72. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971). The Supreme Court
prefers the use of search warrants because a neutral and detached magistrate can determine
whether there is probable cause to search rather than the police acting without anyone to
review the propriety of their actions. Fentresca, 380 U.S. at 105-07.
73. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The police generally provide the
magistrate with an affidavit setting out information about the search. The magistrate, after
considering all the circumstances listed in the affidavit, determines whether there is a "fair
probability" of finding evidence. Id.
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enforcement officers is a novel issue before American courts. The earliest
reported case discussing this issue is the Ninth Circuit's 1989 decision
in United States v. Kerr.74 Since Kerr, twenty-six other courts have
heard arguments concerning the constitutionality of infrared detection to
discern indoor marijuana cultivation.75 The Fifth,76 Seventh,77
74. 876 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. In addition to the detection of
home-grown marijuana, border agents also use infrared detection devices mounted on
helicopters and airplanes (FLIR devices) to track and surveil small aircraft and boats
entering the United States. When used by border agents to track suspected drug
smugglers, the FLIR device operates in much the same way as radar. When used in this
way, the FLIR does not provide information about the interior of the vehicle, and thus,
does not implicate any Fourth Amendment concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Nueva,
979 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1992) (using FLIR device on a United States Customs Service plane
to track a speedboat illegally importing cocaine); United States v. Talavera-Negrete,
No. 91-50453, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7376 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 1992) (tracking aliens
smuggling marijuana across the United States-Mexico border); United States v. Mieres-
Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 654 n.2 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (using FLIR to track a boat suspected of
receiving cocaine via an airdrop); United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1990)
(using FLIR to intercept a plane which was flying low to evade radar and was suspected
of dropping bundles of cocaine); United States v. Sanchez, 829 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1987)
(using FLIR to follow a small plane from Mexico to a rendezvous point in the United
States); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1983) (using FLIR to identify and
track a small plane entering the United States); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th
Cir. 1978) (holding that FLIR could not be used in court as a method to identify a specific
plane suspected of smuggling drugs from other planes of the same type or size); State v.
Strayer, 750 P.2d 390 (Kan. 1988) (using FLIR to follow and later identify a small plane
smuggling marijuana from Texas to Kansas).
Courts recognize a heightened government interest in allowing law enforcement
authorities to conduct searches at United States borders to prevent the importation of
illegal narcotics. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (discussing the
limits of search-and-seizure rights at international airports). The use of infrared detection
to track alleged smugglers is beyond the scope of this Note.
Similar to infrared detection is the use of night-vision equipment and ultraviolet
detection. Technologically, night-vision scopes are closely related to infrared detection.
Unlike infrared detection, however, they enhance visible light rather than visualizing
infrared radiation. They are also used almost exclusively outside and have no ability to
provide information about the interior of a structure. They do not implicate any Fourth
Amendment concerns. See United States v. Ward, 546 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Ark. 1982)
(using night-vision scopes in the open to surveil drug dealer held not a Fourth Amendment
search). But cf State v. Wacker, 826 P.2d 1019 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (using nightscope to
observe defendant's car violated Oregon Constitution).
Police use ultraviolet detection as an invisible marker on decoy contraband in sting
operations to identify criminal suspects. Its use does not raise Fourth Amendment issues.
See United States v. Williams, 902 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1990) (using ultraviolet marker to
track illegal cocaine); Williams v. City of Lancaster, 639 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(identifying person who pulled a false fire alarm using ultraviolet marker).
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Eighth,78 and Eleventh Circuits79 have each ruled that, even absent a
warrant, it is constitutional for police officers to investigate homes for
indoor marijuana cultivation using infrared surveillance techniques. The
Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has declined to resolve the issue on five
separate occasions." No other circuit courts have addressed the
76. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995), rev'g 843 F. Supp. 205
(E.D. Tex. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
77. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 213
(1995). The Myers decision limited the precedential value of the Field decision. United
States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (holding unconstitutional warrantless
infrared detection of a house). See infra notes 148-70 and accompanying text for
discussion of Field).
78. United States v. Robertson, 39 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1994) (precedent dictated
that Robertson follow Pinson), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1812 (1995); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
Police have used infrared detection in other Eighth Circuit cases, but the respective
defendants have failed to raise the issue of the constitutionality of infrared detection. See,
e.g., United States v. Sherrell, 979 F.2d 1315 (8th Cir. 1992) (seeking suppression of
evidence because of lack of probable cause).
79. United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
80. In United States v. Kerr, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate court
to hear arguments concerning the constitutionality of infrared detection. 876 F.2d 1440
(9th Cir. 1989). The defendant argued that the warrantless use of infrared detection
violated the Fourth Amendment, and that evidence obtained from a subsequent valid search
of defendant's property should be suppressed. Id. at 1443. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendant's argument and held that the evidence obtained by using infrared detection was
of such low probative value that it would not effect the later warrant. Id. at 1444-45.
Consequently, the court did not resolve the larger constitutional question. Id.
In United States v. Penny-Feeney, the defendant alleged that the physical evidence
obtained with a valid search warrant was based on information illegally obtained by an
infrared device. 773 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991). The Ninth Circuit, however,
determined that the government had probable cause to search regardless of the information
obtained from the infrared device and decided not to resolve the constitutionality of
infrared devices. United States v. Fenney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1993). See infra
notes 85-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of Penny-Feeney.
In United States v. Leeson, the Ninth Circuit again declined to rule on the constitution-
ality of infrared detection because it found sufficient probable cause for a warrant without
considering the evidence obtained from the infrared device. No. 92-10236, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8257, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 1993).
In United States v. Pugh, the Ninth Circuit held that, even without evidence supplied
by infrared detection, there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and
therefore, there was no need to decide the constitutionality of infrared devices. No. 93-
30443, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25480, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1994).
Finally, in United States v. Kyllo, the Ninth Circuit again declined to rule on the
constitutionality of infrared detection, and remanded the case to the district court for
findings on the technological capabilities of thermal imaging. 37 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir.
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constitutional issue."' Lower federal and state courts82 have decided
both in favor of' and against finding warrantless infrared detection a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.8
1994), modifying26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 809 F. Supp.
787 (D. Or. 1992). See also The Heat is on Pot Growers, Man Caught with Plants in
House Objects to Use ofInfrared Device, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 23, 1995 at D2
(discussing the remand stage of the Kyllo case).
81. The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal have each heard cases alleging the
use of infrared detection devices. However, the courts did not discuss the constitutionality
of infrared detection, nor did the defendants raise it as an issue. See, e.g., United States
v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 287-88 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1993).
82. The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states by incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
83. The following lower courts held that infrared detection of a house is constitutional:
United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393 (D. Wyo. 1994); United States v. Kyllo, 809
F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1993); United States v. Deaner, No. I:CR-92-0090-01, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13046 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp.
220 (D. Haw. 1991); State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
84. Several lower courts held that infrared detection of a house is unconstitutional
unless conducted pursuant to a search warrant. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518
(W.D. Wis. 1994); United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); State v. Binner, 877 P.2d 642 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
A number of state and lower federal courts recognized the Fourth Amendment
implications of infrared detection but failed to rule on its constitutionality. United States
v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the constitutionality of
infrared detection was an issue of first impression in the Second Circuit, and that "it would
be interesting to address" the issue, but declining to do so); State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d
658, 661 (N.D. 1995) (concluding that the magistrate had insufficient evidence to find
probable cause even with the evidence obtained from the infrared device); State v. Russell,
857 P.2d 220, 223 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the
infrared device because the infbrmation obtained did not contribute to probable cause).
In several other state and lower federal court decisions the judges discussed infrared
detection but did not acknowledge any constitutional issues arising from its use. United
States v. Meadows, 881 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (allowing a police officer
to testify as to the results of an infrared device); People v. Smith, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580,
582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting scanning of barn with thermal imager to detect illegal
marijuana production, but not relying on this in its decision); State v. Niel, 640 So. 2d 588,
596 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding the DEA's use or reading of the thermal imager did not
mislead the court); State v. Morrison, 812 P.2d 832, 834 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
failure to list all the high technology devices the authorities used to obtain a search warrant
is not enough to show the authorities acted in bad faith); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984,
987 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (mentioning, but not relying on, use of infrared detection to
confirm strong suspicion of illegal marijuana); State v. Kelley, 762 P.2d 20, 22 (Wash. Ct.
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A. Cases Holding Infrared Detection Is Constitutional
In United States v. Penny-Feeney,5 the United States District
Court for Hawaii ruled that the use of infrared detection devices by
Hawaii County police officers, prior to seeking a search warrant, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches. 86 Federal authorities indicted the defendants, Janice Penny-
Feeney and Sean Feeney, on three counts of federal drug and firearms
violations.87 For two years the police investigated the defendants'
possible drug trafficking.8'
After receiving information from various informants, a police officer
flew over the defendants' residence in a helicopter equipped with a
Forward Looking Infrared Device (FLIR)"9 to corroborate the infor-
mants' information.*° The defendants' residence was dark to the naked
eye, but through the FLIR device the walls and certain areas of the
garage were bright white.9' This indicated to the officer that heat was
escaping from the structure.92 The officer then examined adjacent
houses for comparison,93 but these did not appear in the same color
App. 1988) (mentioning that police twice surveilled garage with infrared detector).
85. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States
v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 230.
87. Id. at 224. The grand jury charged the defendants with "(1) ... cultivating...
more than 100 marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) possessing with
intent to distribute more than 100 marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);
and (3) carrying ... three firearms while committing the two drug offenses in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)." Id.
88. Id. at 221-24.
89. The police leased the FLIR device from the helicopter pilot Id. at 223.
90. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223.
91. Id. at 223-24.
92. Id.
93. Using FLIR devices on houses not under investigation by law enforcement agents,
as a control, or to compare results, may present a separate Fourth Amendment issue.
United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532-33 (W.D. Wis. 1994). Assuming,
arguendo, that drug manufacturers, by the nature of their illegal activity, have no
reasonable expectation of privacy, the law-abiding persons residing on either side of the
drug manufacturer should have an expectation of privacy that society would find
reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (detailing the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard). This problem is compounded by the fact that the
neighbor who is investigated with the FLIR device would have no idea that it occurred,
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contrast as the defendants' house." As a result of the information
gained by the use of infrared detection, in addition to other evidence,
95
the police applied for, and received, a warrant to physically search the
defendants' home.96 After conducting a physical search, the police
arrested the defendants and sought an indictment against them.97
At trial, the defendants sought to suppress the evidence gained from
infrared detection alleging that it amounted to a search conducted without
a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.9" The court denied
the defendants' motion and held that the use of infrared detection did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment."
The Penny-Feeney court began its opinion by stating the two-
pronged Katz test."' First, the court considered the nature of infrared
detection and concluded that the device merely measured the amount of
heat emanating from the structure. ° Second, the court examined the
and thus no recourse at law. Id. Only if the investigation of the neighbor happened to
indicate that they too had an illegal indoor marijuana farm would the neighbor find out
about the examination. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533.
94. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 224.
95. In the affidavit for the search warrant, the police also offered evidence gained from
several informants that had been in the defendants' home. Id. at 221-23. This information
detailed the marijuana operation, where the plants were kept, the equipment used, and how
the defendants packaged and distributed the marijuana. Id.
96. Id. at 224. See supra part III.C. for a discussion of the warrant requirement.
97. Id. The police officers found "approximately 247 marijuana plants ... 10 one-
thousand watt light bulbs, electric transformers, air conditioning units," an altered electric
meter, a drip irrigation system for the plants, books and papers showing drug transactions,
two rifles, and a loaded handgun. Id.
98. 1d. at 224-25. To prevail on a motion to suppress evidence, the defendants must
establish that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the search took place
without a warrant. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (explaining the reasonable expectation of privacy standard). The burden of
proof then shifts to the government to establish that an exception to the warrant
requirement was applicable, and therefore, that the search was reasonable. United States
v. Bachner, 706 F.2d 1121, 1126 (11th Cir. 1983).
In infrared detection cases, the Government generally argues that the use of infrared
detection is not a search at all. See, e.g., State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993). See also United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532-33 (W.D. Wis.
1994) ("The government's legal argument... is that it does not need a reason to look at
anyone's house with a thermal imager, because this is not a search.").
99. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 228.
100. Id. at 225-26.
101. Id. at 225.
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nature of the heat itself, and characterized it as "heat waste," or
"abandoned heat." ' 2  After determining that the police used the
infrared device to measure "heat waste," the court asked whether the
defendants had manifested a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding
their heat waste and whether society viewed this expectation as
reasonable.'0 3 The court concluded that the defendants did not show
an actual expectation of privacy in their home's heat waste because the
defendants vented it outside and they had not attempted to impede its
escape."° The court further concluded that even if the defendants had
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was
not reasonable.105
The court analogized to California v. Greenwood,°6 where the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the
warrantless search of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage0 7
of the home. 0 8 The Penny-Feeney court said that, like garbage, the
heat at issue here was waste matter exposed to the public."° The court
further noted that the fact that one could only detect heat waste by using
infrared technology did not diminish this analogy." '
The court declared that "time and again" the Supreme Court
validated the use of extra-sensory, non-intrusive devices to investigate
objects."' These devices include beepers," 2  drug detection
102. Id. "[Tihe heat was an incidental by-product of various energy sources used to
help cultivate marijuana. Defendants in no way attempted to impede its escape.... ." Id.
The court further noted that defendants even used exhaust fans to vent the heat outside.
Id.
103. Id. at 226.
104. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
105. Id.
106. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
107. The curtilage is the area immediately surrounding a home that an individual may
reasonably expect will remain private. See United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993
n.1 (4th Cir. 1981) (defining curtilage as "an area of domestic use immediately
surrounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced in with a dwelling").
108. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40.
109. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (using beeper to track
movements of a vehicle). But cf United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (using
beeper to monitor activities inside a private residence not open to visual surveillance
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dogs," 3 and pen registers." 4 The court further stated that the use of
the FLIR device to visualize heat sources in this case was much like the
use of a trained dog to sniff drugs,' 15 and like a dog sniff, caused no
embarrassment to or physical contact with the object investigated." 6
Furthermore, the defendants expected the heat to emanate from the
structure because they vented it with fans."' Finally, the court stated
that, like the Supreme Court cases that ratified the use of aerial surveil-
lance, 18 the helicopter search using FLIR caused no physical invasion
of the home, nor did it cause excessive noise, wind, dust or a threat of
injury. 119 Therefore, in this case, society would not recognize the
defendants' expectation of privacy as reasonable.
20
Since United States v. Penny-Feeney was decided, the majority of
courts confronting this issue have found that the use of infrared detection
to surveil a home without a warrant is constitutional.' All of these
courts closely follow the analysis of the Penny-Feeney decision.
In United States v. Pinson,22 the Eighth Circuit effectively ratified
the Penny-Feeney analysis, concluding that a warrantless use of thermal
imaging was constitutional."n The circuit court added that thermal
detection implicated none of the interests that create the need for
violates the Fourth Amendment).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (investigating
luggage with a drug-sniffing dog at an airport not a search). Contra United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (using a drug-sniffing dog outside a
person's dwelling violates the Fourth Amendment).
114. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (using a pen register
to find what numbers were called by a private residence does not constitute a search).
115. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226-27 (citing United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d
880 (9th Cir. 1976)). But cf Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("[T]he canine sniff is sui generis.").
116. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227.
117. Id.
118. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (ratifying aerial surveillance
of an unattached greenhouse using a helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215
(1986) (allowing aerial surveillance of defendant's backyard using a small plane); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (permitting aerial surveillance
of defendant's extensive factory using a precision mapping camera).
119. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 228.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
122. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
123. Id. at 1058-59.
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constitutional protection of a residence, namely intimacy, personal
autonomy, and privacy. 24  In United States v. Ford,125 the Eleventh
Circuit also adopted much of the Penny-Feeney analysis and concluded
that infrared detection did not reveal conversations or human activi-
ties2 6 and that it was more analogous to a smoke plume rising above
a factory.
2 1
The Seventh Circuit became the third federal circuit to hold that
infrared surveillance of a residence did not violate the Fourth
Amendment when conducted without a warrant. In United States v.
Myers, 28 the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits and denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
obtained through infrared detection. 29  The court stated that infrared
detection "does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of
the home."'3
Most recently, in United States v. Ishmael,3' the Fifth Circuit
ruled on the constitutionality of thermal imaging.3 2 The Ishmael court
124. Id. at 1059.
125. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 996. In several other opinions, however, courts note that the opposite is
true; with a thermal imager, law enforcement agents can observe some intimate details
inside a home. In United States v. Olson, police using an infrared device could tell from
the videotape that a divider split the mobile home into two rooms. 21 F.3d 847, 848 n.5
(8th Cir. 1994). In State v. Young, the court observed that an infrared imager "can detect
a human form through an open window when the person is leaning against a curtain," and
that "[t]he device can also detect the warmth generated by a person leaning against a
relatively thin barrier such as a plywood door." 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994). See
also United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531 (W.D. Wis. 1994) ("As for the notion
that thermal imagers do not reveal activities that occur inside the home, if this is so, then
why does the government use thermal imagers to try to detect indoor marijuana growing
operations?").
127. United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Air Pollution
Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (holding
that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment when a state health inspector entered
an outdoor premises and observed and tested a smoke plume)).
128. 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 669-70.
130. Id. at 670.
131. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
132. Id. at 857. In this case the court reviewed the use of thermal imaging to surveil
a building outside the curtilage of the defendant's residence, id. at 851-53, and reasoned
that the use of the device "in an open field" was "passive and nonintrusive," and did not
disturb "[tihe sanctity of one's home or business." Id. at 857.
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reversed the district court's decision which held that the use of thermal
imaging was an unconstitutional search.' 3  The court, however,
criticized the other circuits for applying the first prong of the Katz
analysis-whether the defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of
privacy-in an overly restrictive manner. 34 The Fifth Circuit conclud-
ed, unlike the other courts, 3 5 that the Ishmaels did exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy.1 6 In evaluating the second prong of the Katz
analysis-whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was reason-
able' 37-the court held that the use of thermal imaging was not
unreasonable because other similar types of high technology surveillance
equipment are constitutional, and the police did not physically invade the
Ishmaels' curtilage. 38 Because the court found that the use of thermal
imaging here was permissible, the court held the Ishmaels' expectation
of privacy was not reasonable.' 9
B. Cases Holding Infrared Detection is Unconstitutional
Several courts have rejected the reasoning of Penny-Feeney and its
progeny and instead have held that the warrantless use of infrared
detection is an unconstitutional search. 40  In United States v.
Although the court's holding could be construed as more limited than prior cases, nearly
all thermal imaging of a residence can be done from outside the curtilage, whether in an
open field or from the air. Thus, the court's limitation is illusory.
133. Id. at 853. For a discussion of the district court's opinion, United States v.
Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), see infra notes 173-85 and accompanying
text.
134. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854. For a discussion of the Katz test, see supra notes 56-70
and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding
the defendant did not try to prevent the heat from emanating from his home); United States
v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (1Ith Cir. 1994) (recognizing that defendant voluntarily punched
holes in the floor of his mobile home to vent the heat).
136. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854-55. Ishmael built his lab in secrecy and it was located
in the basement of a secluded, steel building. Id.
137. Id. at 855. For a discussion of the Katz test, see supra notes 56-70 and
accompanying text.
138. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855-56.
139. Id. at 855-57. But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding
that the "reach of the [Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of
a physical intrusion into any given enclosure").
140. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, the Oregon Court of Appeals
held that infrared detection was unconstitutional absent a warrant. State v. Binner, 877
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Field,'14 the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
provided an exhaustive analysis of the infrared detection issue,14 and
concluded that the use of infrared detection was improper.143 In State
v. Young'" the Washington Supreme Court also found that warrantless
infrared detection violated the Fourth Amendment. 145 In United States
v. Ishmael, 46 the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas found
that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they used infrared
detection to surveil a business structure.
147
In Field, the district court adopted the report and recommendation
of the magistrate judge who found that the use of infrared detection
absent a warrant was unconstitutional. 4  The court began its analysis
by noting that individuals normally expect freedom from government
intrusion while at home and that this freedom is clearly reasonable to
society. 149  The Court refused to accept the Government's argument
that police should be free from the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement when using an electronic device to determine whether
persons are conducting illegal activities within their homes. 5
The court reviewed and rejected the line of cases which hold that
P.2d 642 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (reserving judgment on the issue of FLID's constitutionality,
but noting that the trial court found the use of such a device unconstitutional). The
opinion, however, did not discuss the reasoning behind its holding.
141. 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
142. Id. at 1525-33. For the purposes of this Note the arguments in Field will be
considered for their persuasive value.
143. Id. at 1533.
144. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
145. Id. at 601.
146. 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994). The district court decision in Ishmael was
overturned on appeal by United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995), cerl.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). For the purposes of this Note, however, the arguments of
the district court will be considered for their persuasive value.
147. Id. at 213.
148. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1520 (W.D. Wis. 1994). The district
judge explicitly adopted all portions of the magistrate's opinion discussing the constitution-
ality of infrared detection. Id.
149. Id. at 1530.
150. Id. The Field court noted as an initial premise that: "Indiscriminate monitoring
of property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a
threat to privacy interests in the home to escape... Fourth Amendment oversight." Id.
(quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984)).
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the use of infrared detection is a legal search technique because it is
passive and nonintrusive.15 1 The Field court instead relied on United
States v. Taborda,52 where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the use of a high powered telescope to peer into a residence was
unconstitutional even though the telescope was "passive."'53  In
addition, the Field court noted that even though wiretaps are deemed
"passive," they are strictly proscribed absent a warrant. 54 Finally, the
court concluded that because passive devices are capable of invading a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy, the "passivity" of a device
cannot be used to tell if a device violates the Fourth Amendment.
155
The Field court next took up the contention of Penny-Feeney and
later cases that thermal imaging does not reveal details within a
residence. 56 The court noted that if thermal imaging did not reveal
activities within a residence, then the government would not use thermal
imaging to detect indoor marijuana growing operations.' 57 Rather, the
court found that the devices provide visual images of varying quality that
permit the government to draw conclusions about what is happening
within the residence. 5 The court noted that the government often can
151. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1530 ("That thermal imagers collect heat 'passively' is a
red herring."). For a discussion of the cases that hold infrared detection is valid under the
Constitution, see supra part IV.A.
152. 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
153. Id. at 139. The court concluded that law enforcement officials may not use a
telescope to peer into an apartment and gain information that is unavailable to the naked
eye. Id. See also United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976) (noting
that government agents have no right to peer into people's windows with a telescope).
154. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1531. Wiretaps are considered passive because they
simply collect processed sound waves pulsing through a wire located outside the home.
Id. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (listening to the defendant's
conversations violated the Fourth Amendment).
155. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1530-31.
156. Id. at 1531. See also United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (1lth Cir. 1994)
(stating that thermal imagery cannot penetrate walls or windows and can only depict
details within a structure in gross detail); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220,
228 (D. Haw. 1991) (finding that thermal imagery can only detect heat on the "exterior"
of the house).
157. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1531.
158. Id. The court noted that the police tried to downplay the efficacy of thermal
imaging. The court considered this "coyness" "a two-edged sword" because if thermal
imaging does not tell the police anything useful about what is occurring within the resi-
dence, "then it has no value in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a
search warrant." Id. See supra note 126 (concerning whether an infrared imager can
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gain very detailed information by using these devices. 5 9 Because the
whole purpose of using a thermal imager is to learn what is happening
inside the home, the use of thermal imaging constituted a search. 6
The Field court then went on to address arguments that thermal
imaging was analogous to the "garbage exception" held constitutional by
the Supreme Court."" The Field court stated that this analogy, created
in Penny-Fenney, was inappropriate for several reasons.'62 First, taking
out the trash was a conscious and affirmative act that demonstrated that
the resident abandoned the contents of trash. In contrast, the loss of heat
from a home occurred without the resident making a conscious effort to
abandon it. 63 Second, the person who put trash on a curb, according
to the Supreme Court, had common knowledge that the trash was readily
accessible to the public at large.'" However, the resident whose heat
was radiating from her house had no knowledge that the government was
using thermal imaging to detect suspicious heat patterns. 65 The Court
"see" inside a house).
159. Id. The court proposed the following hypothetical:
Hypothesize a homeowner at 1:00 a.m. lying immobile on his bed in a first
story bedroom smoking a cigarette, with a cup of coffee on the night stand,
watching late night television. There are French doors out to a ten foot patio,
leading to a forty foot backyard, beyond which is an alley that is public access.
The doors are open to let in air, but lightweight curtains are drawn to ensure
privacy. Could a properly trained operator with a currently available thermal
imager scan the house from the alley... and discern the heat sources in the
bedroom and draw accurate conclusions about what was happening inside that
room? ... I surmise that if other variables were accounted for, the answer
would be yes.
Id.
160. Id. at 1531-32.
161. Id. at 1532. See Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (searching garbage
bags on the curb does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
162. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1532. Penny-Feeney held that heat escaping from a home
was a form of waste analogous to trash left on a curb for pickup. United States v. Penny-
Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991). See supra notes 106-10 and accompany-
ing text.
163. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1532.
164. "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public." Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226 (quoting California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).
165. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1532.
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thus rejected the garbage analogy because it believed that if individuals
had knowledge that the government used infrared devices to surveil their
homes, they would develop subjective expectations of privacy regarding
their escaped heat.'" Furthermore, if society were aware that these
searches took place, it would recognize an individual's expectation of
privacy concerning the detection of heat sources within the home as
reasonable.' 67
The Field court ended its analysis of infrared detection by discuss-
ing the analogy used by some courts that compares infrared detection to
the use of a trained dog to detect drugs.'68 The court held that this
analogy fell short because while infrared detection can detect marijuana
cultivation from 200 meters away, the government is unable to use dogs
from a remote location.' 69 Additionally, a dog sniff is uniquely precise
because the dogs are trained only in detecting specific contraband, while
a thermal imager visualizes all heat radiation, no matter what its
source. 1
70
The Field court supported its conclusions by looking to two prior
cases, United States v. Ishmael171 and State v. Young.172 In Ishmael,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
discussed the issue of infrared detection in an analytically different
fashion than previous courts.173 The defendants in this case argued that
166. Id. at 1533.
167. Id.
168. Id. See, e.g., Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226-27.
169. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533.
170. Id.
171. 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
172. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
173. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 209-13. The court began by writing:
We must take care that the war on drugs not count as one of its victims
fundamental rights. The benefits to our society of safeguarding the right to
privacy is such that the courts must say that there is a limit to the use of
technological weapons, even in the war on drugs.
Id. at 208.
This Note deals specifically with the issue of the constitutionality of infrared detection
of residences. In Ishmael, the court addressed the related issue of infrared detection of
businesses and business curtilage. Id. at 210-11. The Fourth Amendment affords
protection against the warrantless search of businesses as well as residences. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
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the building174 the police had surveilled was within the curtilage of
their home and was thus protected by the Fourth Amendment. 7 ' The
government asserted that the building stood in an open field, making it
susceptible to surveillance. 76 The court characterized the building as
a business and concluded that it was protected under the "business
curtilage" doctrine, rather than by the curtilage of the defendants'
home. 177  Because a business owner may decide what areas of his
business he will allow the public to view, the court concluded that
Ishmael had a reasonable expectation that the building, and the area
immediately surrounding it, would remain free from government and
public intrusion. 7'
The Government argued that the use of infrared detection was
constitutional because the heat escaping from the building was in "plain
174. The building was a large steel building (40' x 80' x 15') that was located 200-
300 yards behind the residence. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 208.
175. Id. at 209. For a definition of "curtilage" see supra note 107. The Supreme
Court created a four-factor standard to test the extent of the curtilage around a given
residence: (1) the proximity of the area under scrutiny to the home; (2) whether the area
under scrutiny is within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and use of the
area under review; and (4) the effort made by the homeowner to conceal the area under
review. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
176. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 210. The "open fields" doctrine refers to the area
outside of the curtilage that is unoccupied or undeveloped. Id. The doctrine holds that
while a person has a Fourth Amendment right of protection from unlawful searches and
seizures in his home and the area immediately surrounding his home, he has no right of
privacy for activities conducted in the open, e.g., in fields. Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
177. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 210. The court found that Ishmael used the building for
his business, known as R&M Equipment Rental, which was registered with the Texas State
comptroller's office; that the defendant had made purchases of commercial equipment; and
that the building contained both office and warehouse space. Id. Although the building
was not within the home's curtilage, the court was not willing to accept the Government's
argument that the building was in an open field. Id. "[T]o say that the government could
intrude up to the very windows of the building on the basis of the 'open fields' doctrine
simply because it was outside the curtilage of a home, would eviscerate the Fourth
Amendment." Id.
178. Id. at 210-11. The court wrote that the expectation of privacy "logically includes
the water and air systems connected to the building." Id. at 211. Implicit in the court's
opinion that the expectation of privacy includes both the building and the area surrounding
it, is the idea that this privacy includes protection from the detection of things escaping
from the building.
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view"'79 and thus subject to aerial surveillance. 180  The Government
additionally made use of the two popular analogies that infrared detection
was comparable to looking at garbage or using a drug-sniffing dog.'8 '
Although the Supreme Court had previously ratified the use of a high-
precision camera to photograph a factory, the Ishmael court denied the
Government's asserted right to use infrared devices because the devices
recorded images which were not in plain view. 82 The court also held
that heat escaping from a building was not comparable to garbage.'83
The court concluded that the Ishmaels had not abandoned the heat
escaping from their building like trash on a sidewalk, but instead they
had tried to conceal their activity from "human sensory detection."'84
The court further held that infrared detection was unlike a dog sniff for
two reasons. First, infrared detection was far more sophisticated than a
dog sniff, and second, a dog can distinguish between contraband and
noncontraband items. 85
In State v. Young,' 6 the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the
179. Id. at 212. The "plain view" doctrine says that the police may view what may
be seen "from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be." United States v.
Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
180. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 212. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that it was not an unlawful search for the Environmental Protection
Agency to observe a large industrial site using a precision mapping camera in order to
establish evidence of violations of environmental laws. 476 U.S. 227, 234-39 (1986).
181. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 213. See supra notes 106-10 and 160-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the garbage analogy).
182. Id. at 212. The Dow Court noted, "that surveillance of private property by using
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public... might
be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant." Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
183. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 213. The court did say, however, that "[i]f a law
enforcement agent had alleged in an affidavit that while conducting surveillance he felt an
inordinate amount of heat being vented from the building, the waste heat analogy may
have validity." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. The court wrote that "a dog's sense of smell, while more acute than a
human's, does not compare to a technology that can turn minute gradations in temperature
into video tapes from 1500 feet away." Id.
186. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994). The defendant alleged that the infrared surveillance
of his residence violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Id. at 595. Because greater
protection may be available under a state constitution, the court examined the defendant's
second allegation first. Id. at 595-96. After concluding that the infrared surveillance
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warrantless use of infrared detection on a residence violated the Fourth
Amendment. 87 In addition to discussing many of the points covered
in Field,"8 the court noted that, with regard to electronic tracking
devices, the Supreme Court has differentiated between the use of such
devices in the home and their use in other areas.'89 The court pointed
out that the United States Supreme Court found a Fourth Amendment
violation when law enforcement authorities allowed a beeper to operate
within a home, but did not find a Fourth Amendment violation when the
authorities used a beeper outside the home. 9' In the same way, the
Young court continued, the use of infrared surveillance on residences
impermissibly allows the police to gain otherwise unobtainable informa-
tion concerning heat sources within a home.' 9' Because it provides
information about the activities within a residence, the court concluded
that the use of infrared technology, without a warrant, is a search and
thus violates the Fourth Amendment. 192
violated the Washington State Constitution, the court proceeded to analyze whether
infrared surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 601. Although it was not
necessary for the court to discuss the Fourth Amendment issue, it chose to do so "for the
purpose of providing guidance to other courts." Id.
187. Id. at 601.
188. See supra notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
189. Young, 867 P.2d at 601.
190. Id. at 601-02. The court contrasted two Supreme Court decisions, United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 f1984), and United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). In
Knotts, police placed a beeper inside an object commonly used in illegal drug activity.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-79. When the object was placed within the defendant's car the
authorities traced the movement of the car with the beeper. Id. However, when the object
was taken inside the house the agents did not use the beeper. Id. at 278-79. The Court
held that this activity was constitutional because the information received by using the
beeper could have been discovered by following the car. Id. at 285.
In Karo, the police placed a similar beeper in a can of ether, which the defendant
moved from place to place. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-11. When the defendant moved the
can from one place to another, the police used the beeper to locate the can. Id. The Court
held that using the beeper to determine whether the can was inside a house was a search
because the beeper revealed information about the interior of the home that the agents
could not have attained through visual surveillance of the home's exterior. Id. at 715. See
also supra note 112 (discussing the use of beepers).
191. Young, 867 P.2d at 602. The court noted that while "an electronic device... [is]
less intrusive than a full-scale search.... it does reveal a critical fact about the interior
of a premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not
have otherwise obtained without a warrant." Id. (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 715).
192. Id. at 604.
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V. ANALYZING THE INFRARED DETECTION CASES
A. The Application of the Katz Test
To put the current infrared detection cases into perspective it is
necessary to discuss them with reference to the original basis for the Katz
test-the increasing ability of law enforcement authorities to pry into
people's private lives without physically trespassing. 93 The Katz
decision greatly limited the freedom afforded to law enforcement agents
to conduct searches.9' Under Katz, a warrantless search is unconstitu-
tional if the individual has an actual expectation of privacy and society
recognizes this expectation of privacy as reasonable.'95 This test
balances personal privacy needs with society's need to enforce the
laws.'9 The application of Katz to novel technology, however, shows
the limitation of the doctrine. Katz poorly applies to situations involving
remote surveillance technology, especially given the willingness of
judges to fall back to concepts of trespass when challenged with new
technology.' 97
There are a number of reasons behind the poor application of the
Katz test to infrared detection. Perhaps the greatest reason for this
problem is the lack of information a court has when determining whether
the two prongs have been met.'98 With regard to the defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy, in most cases the defendant has little
knowledge of the capabilities of law enforcement surveillance. Thus, the
defendant has done little to prevent the detection of infrared sources in
193. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[Ihe reach of [the Fourth]
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.").
194. See id. at 352 (mentioning that prior to this case the absence of physical trespass
foreclosed any Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
195. Id. at 361.
196. One commentator stated that Katz "marks a watershed in fourth amendment
jurisprudence" and has "extraordinary character and implications." Amsterdam, supra note
2, at 382-83.
197. A number of courts have allowed concepts of"trespass" to enter their discussions.
See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994) ("'The heat-sensing
device did not invade Pinson's home nor its curtilage, nor did it emit rays into his home
.... ."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994). A faithful application of Katz would prohibit
such considerations.
198. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
276 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 49:247
his home. 99 Because the defendant. generally has no knowledge of
infrared detection the question of whether he has a subjective expectation
of privacy is unanswerable.
With respect to the question of whether society would find the
defendant's expectation of privacy reasonable, the courts agree that
society has little or no knowledge of infrared detection techniques."1
This is important because the Katz test requires the judge to gauge the
beliefs of "society" in some objective manner.2"' In the context of a
surveillance technique that the defendant, society, and the judge know
nothing about until the case is tried, the ability of the judge to make a
reasonable determination of the values of a free and open society
concerning that technology must be viewed with skepticism.
Another problem with the way the Katz test is applied in infrared
detection cases is the tendency of courts to construe the scope of the
Katz analysis as broadly or as narrowly as necessary to fit the conclusion
at which they will arrive. For example, implicit in the Katz framework
is the initial task of characterizing to what the expectation of privacy
refers.202 In Penny-Feeney, the court considered whether there was an
expectation of privacy in "heat waste."203  The court in that case
looked only at whether or not the defendant tried to conceal his sources
199. This is a common-sense assumption in marijuana production cases, given the
great lengths defendants typically go to in order to conceal their operations from visual or
aural detection. See also United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532 (W.D. Wis.
1994) ("It is hardly common knowledge that government officials cruise the public streets
after dark scanning houses with thermal imagers, seeking to interpret heat patterns.").
200. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533 ("[I]t is not clear that the public is aware either of
the capabilities of thermal scanners or the use to which they are being put, or could be
put."). But cf. United States v. Deaner, No 1:CR-92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13046, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992) (writing with regard to FLIR that "[t]he technology
employed is 'off the shelf,' having been in general use for fifteen years").
201. The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if
the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted
to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.
202. The issue in Katz was whether a person's expectation of privacy in a public
telephone is reasonable. Justice Harlan opined that, "a man's home is ... a place where
he expects privacy. .. . On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be
protected... for the expectation of privacy... [is] unreasonable." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
203. See supra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
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of heat from detection.' In Field, a case factually similar to Penny-
Feeney, the court characterized the expectation of privacy as being
freedom from government intrusion while at home.05 The Field court
looked for a manifestation of a desire to prevent surveillance general-ly. 206
If a court determines that the expectation of privacy refers to "heat
waste," then the individual has no expectation of privacy from surveil-
lance and the search is constitutional. On the other hand, if the court
determines that the expectation of privacy refers to the sanctity of the
home, then the search is unconstitutional.2 7 In the former cases the
courts invariably find a lack of subjective expectation of privacy because
the defendant could not hide the heat waste from detection.208 In the
latter cases, however, the courts find a subjective expectation of privacy,
even though the defendant had no knowledge of infrared radiation,
because defendants generally have an expectation of privacy in their
homes.2°
Another criticism of the infrared detection cases is that they have
raised the ghost of the "physical trespass" doctrine, 210 repudiated by
Katz,2 1' in the form of considerations of "intrusiveness. 212  "Intru-
siveness" refers to the amount of inconvenience or disruption a given
surveillance method causes. But a surveillance method can be more
violative of Fourth Amendment privacy precisely because it is
204. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991). In State
v. McKee, the defendant argued that he had sought to conceal the heat sources, thus
establishing a subjective expectation of privacy. 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993). However, notwithstanding that fact, the court held that the defendant did not
establish a subjective expectation of privacy because the infrared surveillance device did
not invade the home or the curtilage, nor did it reveal the defendant's activities within.
Id. at 810.
205. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1530 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
206. Id. at 1524.
207. See supra part IV.
208. See, e.g., Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
209. See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1527-29.
210. For a discussion of the "physical trespass" doctrine, see supra notes 44-53 and
accompanying text. See, e.g. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 228 ("Use of the FLIR in this
case caused absolutely no physical invasion of the home or curtilage.").
211. See supra section III.B.
212. See, e.g., Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223 (describing the FLIR as
nonintrusive, passive).
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unintrusive, allowing a person to be investigated in their home without
knowing it."' Even if a particular method of surveillance is found to
be very intrusive, this finding does nothing to advance the Katz analysis,
which concentrates on expectations of privacy.
One final criticism of the way courts have decided infrared detection
cases concerns the use of other Fourth Amendment precedent. Search
and seizure cases often have limited holdings, made with specific
reference to location, the characteristics of the search, and a number of
other factual circumstances.1 4 Courts reviewing Fourth Amendment
search cases, however, tend to make broad statements concerning the
constitutionality of whole categories of technology, which confuse, if not
totally misstate, the law.215 This tendency toward overstatement of
precedent necessarily results in confusion among courts and should be
consciously avoided.
The Katz test has been ineffective in its application to infrared
detection. The ineffectiveness of the test has led litigants and judges to
rely on analogies to other surveillance methods to discuss the constitu-
tionality of infrared detection.
B. Argument By Analogy
Because the Katz doctrine provides no clear direction to courts in
deciding whether infrared surveillance of residences is constitutional,
litigants and courts rely on analogies to resolve this issue.216 For
example, the prosecution in these types of cases often argues that
because infrared technology shares characteristics with a certain
213. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
214. For example, in the leading case discussing the constitutionality of narcotic dog
sniffs, the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for a law enforcement official to
use a narcotics dog to sniff a passenger's luggage in an airport, as the passenger is leaving
a plane, if the passenger is not detained for an unreasonable period of time. United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983). This holding is specific concerning the place of the
investigation (an airport), the thing to be investigated (luggage), and the method of
investigation (a brief dog sniff). Courts in infrared detection cases, however, have
characterized this precedent as holding that dog sniffs are always constitutional. This is
not the case. In fact, a dog sniff of a residence, which is the location where thermal
imaging often takes place, has been held to be an unconstitutional search. United States
v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
215. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226-28 (D. Haw.
1994).
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technology that may constitutionally be used absent a search warrant,
then, a fortiori, the use of infrared technology is constitutional without
a search warrant. Prosecutors have effectively used this technique to
argue that heat radiating from a house is just like garbage,217 and the
use of infrared technology is just like a narcotics dog, aerial surveillance,
or smoke.218
While argument by analogy is a time-honored method of legal
reasoning, its unlimited use in this area results in confusion concerning
the capabilities of infrared detection2 9 and leads to irrational results.
One problem with analogy is that it tends to cause attorneys and judges
to overstate and misapply prior case law concerning related surveillance
methods." ° In addition, the use of analogy in this context forces each
side of the issue to adopt strained arguments that are unrealistic. Courts
confronted with infrared detection cases may assert any of the following:
(1) radiation visualized by infrared detection is like abandoned gar-
bage;22' (2) radiation is as easily detected as a plume of smoke;'
and (3) infrared technology is as simple and effective as the use of a
narcotics dog,' and as permissible as aerial surveillance. 24 However,
these analogies fail to assert, although equally true, that humans cannot
directly sense infrared radiation through sight, touch, hearing, smell, or
taste. In addition, these analogies overlook that infrared technology goes
much further than simply amplifying human sensory capabilities and can
actually provide information about activities within a building.
Furthermore, they fail to consider that most people have little or no
knowledge of the existence of this technology.225 These concerns lead
to the final criticism of the cases that have decided the constitutionality
217. The author would like to note his disagreement with this prosecutorial theory
because, unlike garbage left on the curb, the heat detected through thermal imaging cannot
be seen, touched, or smelled, nor is it outside the curtilage of the home.
218. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
219. See infra part V.C.
220. See supra part IV.A. (concerning misapplication of precedents).
221. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 733 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1994). Contra
United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
222. United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994).
223. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227. Contra Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533.
224. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227-28. Contra United States v. Ishmael, 843 F.
Supp. 205, 212 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
225. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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of infrared imaging-that the courts have failed to consider the actual
capabilities of infrared technology in their opinions.
C. The Capabilities of Infrared Detection
Courts have failed to reach a consensus regarding the capabilities of
infrared detection. In each case the parties debate over whether infrared
detection equipment "sees" into houses and whether the equipment
detects the surface of the object visualized or the interior of the
object.226 Courts discuss the technology in hyperbolic terms, accentuat-
ing qualities they favor and down-playing qualities they do not.227
Few, if any, courts have attempted to evaluate the technology on its own.
Instead, they choose to coin the analogies used by the defense or
prosecution. Unless the courts become familiar with the scientific facts
of infrared detection, and in turn develop a regular standard to evaluate
its use, the debate will remain mired in confusion and inconsistencies.
VI. RESTORING THE KATz DOCTRINE: A PROPOSAL
FOR THE SUPREME COURT
This Note proposes two cumulative solutions to the question of how
courts should proceed in evaluating the constitutionality of infrared
surveillance of homes-a minimal solution and a more substantial
solution. This effort is grounded in realism with regard to both the
courts' political will concerning fundamental rights that inhibit law
enforcement's ability to enforce the laws, and the resolve of the Supreme
Court.
A. Protection from Unconstitutional Invasions
Courts must continue to give careful consideration to the Fourth
Amendment before deciding to allow infrared surveillance without a
search warrant. This is especially true given the increasing ability of law
enforcement authorities to gain access into people's private lives without
physically trespassing. The cases that have ruled on the constitutionality
of infrared detection demonstrate how easily the courts can erode
constitutional rights. The analysis provided by the courts that follow
Penny-Feeney is not persuasive. These courts rely on strained logic to
226. See, e.g., State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598-99 (Wash. 1994).
227. Compare discussion of Penny-Feeney, supra notes 100-20 with discussion of
Field, supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
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decide this issue and fail to balance the societal need for privacy with the
need to enforce the laws. 8 A faithful reading of the Katz decision
compels the conclusion that the infrared detection of a home is unconsti-
tutional absent a search warrant." 9 The essence of the Katz decision
is that individuals deserve protection from searches where they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. An expectation of privacy at home is
clearly reasonable. Thus, courts should require law enforcement agents
to obtain a search warrant before conducting infrared surveillance of a
residence.230 The Supreme Court traditionally has afforded the utmost
protection from governmental scrutiny to the home.2" To prevent the
228. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 1974) ("In
determining the reasonableness of a search, one must... balance the need for the search
against the invasion of privacy involved.").
229. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. A number of other articles have
discussed the constitutionality of infrared detection. See Melinda Foster, Note, State v.
Young: A Cool View Toward Infrared Thermal-Detection Devices, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 135
(1994) (arguing that although the use of thermal imaging was found unconstitutional by
the Washington Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court would find it
constitutional); Steele, supra note 31 (providing a history of infrared detection cases and
suggesting that the use of infrared detection requires a warrant); Plaschke, supra note 27,
at 615 (concluding that the Deaner court erroneously held that infrared detection did not
violate the Fourth Amendment); Pochurek, supra note 28, at 165-67 (finding use of
infrared detection, absent a search warrant, unconstitutional).
230. The Fourth Amendment should be construed liberally for the security of persons
and property. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
The author acknowledges that there are two drawbacks to the recommended action.
First, more people will grow marijuana at home, and second, law enforcement agents will
have to work harder to collect sufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant before they
can conduct infrared detection. While these are not minor concerns, the author believes
their importance is less than the dangers associated with the loss of constitutional
protections of privacy in the home.
231. "[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions
since the origins of the Republic."' Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)).
"[Elvery unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The genesis of our traditional notion of the sanctity of the home embedded in the Fourth
Amendment has long been thought to be Pitt's address in the House of Commons in
March 1763: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!" Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54
(1980) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).
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erosion of Fourth Amendment principles, courts should scrupulously
maintain this protection. 2
Additionally, obtaining a warrant to search a home is a simple
procedure. 3 The search warrant remains an effective way to balance
the needs of law enforcement officers with the constitutional rights of
citizens. A warrant is essential because police officers can conduct
infrared surveillance with no preparation, as long as it is nighttime. 4
Thus, court approval of the warrantless use of infrared detection may
lead to indiscriminate use of this technology by law enforcement officers
"fishing" for violations of law.
A minimal solution to the Fourth Amendment infrared detection
problem would require the Supreme Court to declare the use of such
devices unconstitutional without a warrant. If the Court is willing to so
hold, then it may also choose to tackle the greater problem of the
irrelevance of the Katz test in remote surveillance technology cases.
B. Curing the Ills of Katz
The Supreme Court should undertake an effort to clarify and
revalidate the operation of the Katz doctrine. This may involve a number
of related tasks, each of which may require substantial analytical work.
Potential routes include: (1) defining in hierarchical terms the different
levels of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment and assigning a
rough level of protection to each of them;" 5 (2) detailing in more
232. "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
It is unnecessary, however, for the Supreme Court to rule that infrared detection is
unconstitutional in all situations. When police want to use it to surveil a residence the
Court should require a warrant. But, under other circumstances the Fourth Amendment
considerations may not be sufficiently serious to require a warrant. See State v.
Slowikowski, 743 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (presenting the idea that given
surveillance methods could be constitutionally proscribed in some situations and not in
others).
233. See supra part III.C. and accompanying notes.
234. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
235. The hierarchy could look like this (starting with the greatest protection):
(I) bodily autonomy (freedom from physical violation); (2) protection of personal papers
and effects from physical search; (3) protection of the privacy of the home; (4) protection
of business privacy; (5) protection of personal real property (open fields); (6) protection
of real business property; (7) protection within a car, (8) protection in public (generally);
and (9) protection at United States borders.
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definite and concrete terms the scope of the two Katz standards, the
subjective expectation of privacy and the societal reasonableness
standard;" 6 (3) limiting each holding of the court to the specific
technology involved;" 7 and (4) creating a standard with regard to novel
technologies, whereby a new technology would be presumed to require
a search warrant until either the Supreme Court rules on it, or one party
can prove that a sufficient cross-section of society knows about its
existence and implications.
VII. CONCLUSION
The analytical problems associated with the application of the
Fourth Amendment to the police use of infrared technology are
indicative of difficulties that will recur as law enforcement officers
continue to bring scientific advances to bear on criminal activity."
While these advances are certainly favorable in their ability to monitor
and apprehend criminals, the courts must take care that these advances
do not wipe out fundamental protections as they wipe out crime. A
ruling by the Supreme Court that requires officers to obtain a warrant
before engaging in the infrared surveillance of a home should be the first
step in dealing with these technological developments.
James Francis Barna*
For each hierarchical level the Court would give a rough guide as to the level of privacy
violation that it finds unacceptable. The Court has done this in a rudimentary fashion in
some respect, by holding that the home deserves heightened protection. See supra note
231.
236. But cf Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 383-84 (arguing that the Katz opinion left
the Fourth Amendment inquiry purposefully vague).
237. Any holding concerning a Fourth Amendment issue which involves the novel use
of technology should state: (I) whether it is constitutional absent a search warrant;
(2) what location was searched using this technology; (3) whether the person being
observed or listened to had manifested a desire for privacy; and (4) how intrusive the
search was. This last category should not be confused with actual trespass, but instead
should consider to what extent the search entered comparatively secret areas or privacies.
238. New law enforcement devices being tested and developed include electromagnetic
wave imagers and passive millimeter wave imagers which can detect objects through
clothing and walls at a distance of fifty feet. See Bob Dart, The Battle for Techno-Tools;
The Thin Blue Line Between Law Enforcement and Rights, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 25, 1994,
at 46-47. See also Laurent Belsie, New Era of Electronic Snooping Draws Static,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 9, 1995, at I (criticizing the Clinton administrations'
proposal to loosen restrictions on covert electronic eavesdropping).
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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